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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1957
fed by compulsory property tax levies32 and deductions from the pay of
employee-members. 33
The funds maintained by the City of Lakewood became depleted, so
that it became impossible to meet current pension payments. The city
council declined to appropriate other municipal funds to make up deficits.
In Lakewood Firemen's Relief and Pension Fund Trustees v. City of Lake-
wood,34 the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held that the provisions
of the statutes35 which require a tax of 0.3 mill on all real and per-
sonal property in the municipality to provide moneys for the funds and
which permit the appropriation of sufficient money to meet current pay-
ments ".. . if at any time the moneys to the credit of the fund are not
sufficient to meet current relief and pension payments .. ..36 are, respec-
tively, mandatory and permissive, and that the appropriation of additional
moneys cannot be compelled by the courts.
The decision is obviously correct so far as the law goes. The prob-
lem remains, for legislative or other solution, of how superannuated em-
ployees are to be cared for without throwing them upon relief or old age
pension rolls.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Negotiability. Signature: Carbon Copy
Chrismer v. Chrismer1 raises an intriguing point. The payee -brought
an action on a negotiable promissory note, but produced only'a carbon
copy. The maker had apparently signed his name on the original, and,
of course, the signature had gone through the carbon paper and appeared
on the carbon copy. The court held that the carbon copy was not a
negotiable instrument. A carbon copy of an instrument, which bears a
carbon copy of what purports to be the signature of the maker, does not
meet the requirements of the Negotiable Instruments Law, in the opinion
of the court. The signature is made by imprint of the carbon paper,
whereas, decides the court, it must be an original signature in order to be
genuine and legal within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments
Law, section 1 of which2 requires that the instrument be in writing and
OHIo REV. CODE §§ 741.09-.40.
SOHIO REV. CODE §§ 741.12-.43.
't 144 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
=Supra. note 32.
' Ibkl.
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signed by the maker or drawer. The court also considered section 18 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law,3 which provides that no person shall be
liable on an instrument whose signature does -not appear -thereon, and
section 184,4 which defines a negotiable promissory note and includes
the requirement that it be signed by the maker.
Having held that the carbon copy was not a negotiable instrument,
the court then decided that it was not admissible in evidence without
laying the proper foundation to account for the absence of the original.
I must confess that the ratio decidendi disturbs me. Inasmuch as a
signature may be printed, engraved, lithographed, or photographed,
so long as it is adopted as the signature of the particular party,5
it is difficult to understand why a signature made through a piece of
carbon paper does not meet the requirements if the parties so intend.
But do they intend the carbon copy to be a negotiable instrument? Is
the carbon copy anything more than a record of the transaction? And
what about the person who buys the carbon copy from the payee? Is he
not on notice that an original may be in existence and consequently is
he not precluded from becoming a holder in due course? Unfortunately,
-limitations of time and space make a complete analysis of the problem
impossible. In any event, in the instant case the suit was between the
immediate parties, so that negotiability would not seem to -be involved.
Liability: Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Show
That Person Signed in a Representative Capacity
Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law3 -provides, in sub-
stance, that if the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature
words indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, he is -not
liable on the instrument if duly authorized. One of the typical situations
is where an officer of a corporation signs his name to a corporate note
without indicating any official -tide. Is he then personally liable or may
it be shown that the intention of the parties was not to bind him per-
sonally and that in fact he signed only for the corporation? Two recent
Ohio cases bear upon -this important matter.
In E. R. Johnstone Machinery Co. v. Owens Screw Products, Inc.,t
the notes were signed as follows:
1 103 Ohio App. 23, 144 N.E.2d 494 (1956).
2 OIo REV. CODE S 1301.03 (A).
' Omo REv. GODE S 1301.20.
'OHIO REV. CODE S 1307.02.
'See BRriON, BILLS AND NOTEs 33 (1943).
6 OHIO REV. CODE 5 1301.22. The wording is slightly, but not materially, different.
'76 Ohio L. Abs. 184, 145 N.E.2d 559 (Munic. Ct. 1957).
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Owens Screw Products, Inc.
Stanley Heilbronner, Vice Pres.
A. M. Donofrio
Suit was by the payee, and the question concerned Donofrio's lia-
bility. The court held that parol evidence was admissible to show that
Donofrio intended to sign only as president of the Owens corporation
and not as an individual, and to show that the payee likewise intended
Donofrio's signature to bind only the corporation and not himself."
However, the court also held that the proof must be by clear and con-
vincing evidence and -that Donofrio had failed to meet this burden, the
evidence having fallen short of showing that the payee understood that
Donofrio was signing in a representative capacity.P
The other recent case bearing on this general question is Rood v.
McCann.10 On the lower left-hand side of the printed note -there ap-
peared an imprint of the corporation seal of the M. and I. Sanitation
Company. On the lower right-hand side, in the place where makers
customarily sign, there appeared the following signatures:
Jack M. McCann
Claude M. Morrow
McCann's liability was -the issue.
In this instance the plaintiff was a purchaser of the note from the
payee. The court 'held that parol evidence would be admissible to show
that McCann signed as secretary of the corporation; that there was no
intention that -he be personally liable; and that plaintiff so understood."
Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law was not referred to.
Liability. Delivery on Condition That Signature of
Another Person Be Obtained
In Public Loan Corporation v. Jacobs'2 the defendant, Jacobs, signed
a note as co-maker and delivered it to the payee with the express under-
standing that Jacobs was not to be bound unless the signature of one
Helen Russell was obtained on the note. Plaintiff turned the note over
to James Russell in order that he might get Helen's signature. James
returned with a signature purporting to be Helen's. The signature was
aSee BRI ON, BILLS AND NoTas 5 164 (1943) for a splendid discussion of the
question.
" Te court did not refer to the Negotiable Instruments Law.
" 103 Ohio App. 55, 144 N.E.2d 263 (1957), motion to certify overruled (1957).
' The court also indicates that even if plaintiff assumed that McCann signed as an
individual rather than on behalf of the corporation, the presence of the corporate
seal would put him on notice that this might not be so.
' 75 Ohio L Abs. 572, 144 N.E.2d 505 (Ct. App. 1955).
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